On September 28, 1958, 80% of the voters approved by referendum the new Constitution according to which the nation was led by a president elected by local representatives. The president appointed his prime minister and, in fact, the ministers, and could have the referendum instrument, in front of a Parliament which, although weakened and easy to dissolve, retained the power to overthrow the government. The solution to the Algerian problem would have turned out to be much more troubled. On the strength of the success obtained in the vote of 28 September, de Gaulle inaugurated a policy of dialogue with the leaders of the rebellion organized in the FLN (Front de libération nationale), proclaiming the principle of self-determination by virtue of which Algerians were granted the right to choose their own destiny by referendum. This policy impressed international observers favorably, but provoked a lively opposition within and above all in the circles of the settlers of Algeria. Faced with the probability of losing the pre-eminent positions enjoyed in the colony and being submerged in the referendum by the Algerian votes, this opposition did not hesitate to take sides against de Gaulle himself. The consultation of January 8, 1961, which saw the proponents of self-determination prevail, prompted the supporters of French Algeria to play it all. In an attempt to block the ongoing process, the OAS (Organization de l’armée secrète) multiplied the attacks and acts of terrorism. A military putsch that broke out in April in Algiers decreed a state of siege and led to the arrest of the representatives of the central government, while in Pari-gi de Gaulle it assumed the extraordinary powers, which were provided for by the Constitution. The refusal by various commanders to follow the rebel generals led to the failure of the putsch within a few weeks. Long negotiations then began, which were interrupted several times and were accompanied by an impressive resurgence of terrorist activities and attacks by the OAS, one of which, having failed, was directed on 9 September 1961 against de Gaulle himself. In March 1962 the Evian agreements were finally reached, which were then ratified by referendum. By virtue of them, France in July 1962 solemnly recognized the independence of Algeria.

Finally freed the country from the heavy burden that had conditioned and weakened it up to that moment, de Gaulle raised the question of the election of the President of the Republic. Instead of the college of notables provided for by art. 6 of the 1958 Constitution, he proposed that it be designated by universal suffrage, leaving the question to a subsequent referendum. The objective of de Gaulle, always hostile to parties and to the degeneration of parliamentary life, was transparent. A president of the Republic elected by universal suffrage would have been invested with a degree of authority that would place him clearly above the parties, becoming the direct representative of the nation. The opponents reacted by getting approval from the National Assembly a motion of censure in which the procedure chosen to reach the referendum was declared unconstitutional. De Gaulle in turn replied by dissolving Parliament and calling legislative elections, to be held after the referendum. The referendum took place on October 28, 1962 and marked the victory, albeit not overwhelming, of the yes. Much more relevant was the success obtained in the subsequent political elections which ensured a stable parliamentary majority for the Gaullists and the moderates of V. Giscard d’Estaing. Thanks to this statement, de Gaulle was able to confirm G. Pompidou, his adviser for some time, to whom he had already entrusted in April 1962 the task of forming the second government of the Fifth Republic.

According to Homosociety.com, the party regime de Gaulle had blamed for the oblivion of what he held to be an incontrovertible truth, that France could not exist without grandeur., that is, without proposing objectives of international affirmation adequate to the nation’s past and its possibilities. The commitment to return to France a worthy foreign policy was therefore placed as a priority from the beginning. The downsizing of the international role of the two superpowers (USA and USSR) and the creation of Europe was part of the Gaullist perspective: not the Europe of the federalists, endowed with supranational powers, but the Europe of ‘homelands’, a confederation of states sovereigns. In order for such a Europe to be viable, it had to free itself from American tutelage at all costs. Consistently, in de Gaulle’s Europe there was no place for Great Britain, seen as longa manus of Washington, while the rapprochement with Germany in the framework of a peaceful Europe “from the Atlantic to the Urals” became central.